Like other countries seeking a progressive path to universalism, Peru has attempted to reduce inequalities in access to health care by granting the poor entitlement to tax-financed basic care without charge. We identify the impact of this policy by comparing the target population's change in health care utilization with that of poor adults already covered through employment-based insurance. There are positive effects on receipt of ambulatory care and medication that are largest among the elderly and the poorest. The probability of getting formal health care when sick is increased by almost two fifths, but the likelihood of being unable to afford treatment is reduced by more than a quarter. Consistent with the shallow coverage offered, there is no impact on use of inpatient care. Neither is there any effect on average out-of-pocket health care expenditure, but medical spending is reduced by up to 25% in the top quarter of the distribution.
INTRODUCTION
Provision of basic health care for the poor is sometimes proposed as a stepping stone on a bottom-up path to universal health coverage (Cotlear et al., 2015) . The strategy involves directing resources of severely constrained public health systems to the priority of improving access for the poor. Yet this form of progressive universalism (Gwatkin and Ergo, 2011; Jamison et al., 2013) can be thrown off track by inaccurate targeting of the poor, ineffective fee waivers, and inadequate budgets that leave underfunded and understaffed facilities with little capacity to respond to increased demand, sparse provision in rural areas, and a narrow benefit package that does nothing to reduce the risk of immiserizing payments for hospital care. Free public health care for the poor cannot be presumed to deliver on the promise of more equitable access and improved protection from medical expenditure risks. There is relatively little evidence on the extent to which it does. This paper evaluates an attempt to reduce inequality in access by providing poor Peruvian adults with fully subsidized coverage for basic health care at public facilities. Potential brakes on the effectiveness of the programme included reliance on a proxy means test to identify the poor, tight supply-side constraints due to manpower shortages and inadequate provision in rural areas, and weak incentives for providers to meet demand arising from the removal of user fees that were previously an important source of revenue.
We identify the impact of the reform by comparing the target population's change in health care utilization and out-of-pocket (OOP) expenditure with those of poor adults who were already covered through employment-based insurance. We find positive effects on receipt of ambulatory care, medication, and diagnostic tests that are large relative to baseline rates. The difference-in-differences (DID) estimates are generally robust to conditioning on covariates by logit, least squares, and inverse probability weighting (IPW). There is no evidence that the treatment and comparison groups were following different trends prior to the reform. The impacts increase over time, suggesting that the reform took a couple of years to become fully effective. They are larger in the older and the poorest populations that are likely to have had the greatest unmet need for care prior to being covered.
There is no significant impact on receipt of inpatient treatment. This is consistent with the exclusion of much tertiary care from the benefit package and with ceilings placed on coverage, but it may also be attributable to the weak incentives for providers to deliver high cost procedures at a low rate of reimbursement. Supply constraints have left effective coverage short of nominal coverage for higher level treatments.
The increased use of ambulatory care appears to be due to effective implementation of the mandated exemption of the poor from fees at public facilities. The probability that a poor person is treated by a formal health care provider when sick is increased by almost two fifths, but the probability that financial circumstances prevent the infirm from seeking formal treatment is reduced by more than a quarter. Despite this, there is no impact on mean OOP medical expenditure. This is likely due to the offsetting effect of increased utilization of treatments that are only partially covered, or even entirely uncovered. There are significant reductions ofThere is surprisingly little credible evidence on the impact of subsidized public health care for the poor. 1 An Indonesian scheme that provides the poor with access to basic health care at public facilities without charge is found, like the similar Peruvian programme that we evaluate, to increase use of ambulatory care (Sparrow et al., 2013) . Less consistent with our results, but similar to Bernal et al. (2016) , this study finds some evidence of a positive impact on OOP spending, particularly in urban areas and among richer households that manage to enrol despite the targeting. Health insurance for the poor in Colombia, which differs markedly from the Peruvian and Indonesian variants, is found to raise preventive care and consultations when sick but not hospitalization rates (Miller et al., 2013) . The level and the variance of OOP spending are reduced, consistent with insurance offering substantial protection against medical expenditure risk. A similar managed competition insurance programme in Georgia that has no copayments for medical care but excludes drugs from the benefit package also appears to reduce mean OOP payments and the risk of heavy spending on inpatient treatment but has no impact on utilization (Bauhoff et al., 2011 ). Mexico's Seguro Popular, which in principle offers fully subsidized health insurance only to the poor but in practice covers all who enrol without charge, has also been found to reduce OOP spending without impacting on health care utilization (King et al., 2009) . The same conclusion is reached with respect to the impact of health insurance for the poor in Vietnam (Wagstaff, 2010) .
Despite the controversy generated by user fees, there is even less sound evidence on their effects than there is for targeted health insurance (Lagarde and Palmer, 2008) . 2 We know of no study that convincingly identifies the impact of individual, as opposed to geographic, targeted removal of user fees.
3 Before-and-after studies generally show increased utilization of outpatient care but not inpatient care after universal removal of user fees (ibid, Table 7 ). Comparison among rural districts of Zambia in which fees were removed and (peri-) urban areas in which they were not (until later) reveals no impact on utilization but the near elimination of OOP medical expenditures (Lépine et al., 2015) .
Overall, evidence on the impact of subsidized health care for the poor in low-and middle-income countries is scant and contradictory. We add evidence on Peru's initial targeted coverage programme that possessed many characteristics typical of attempts to follow a bottom-up path to universal coverage (Cotlear et al., 2015) .
HEALTH CARE AND INSURANCE IN PERU

Health insurance before the 2007 reform
At the time of the coverage extension, Peru was an upper middle-income country spending only 4.5% of GDP on health care (World Health Organization, 2016) . Just over half (54%) of this expenditure was publicly financed. The greatest part of the remainder (40%) was paid for OOP (ibid). Over three fifths of the 28 million population had no health insurance (INEI, 2006) . 4 They paid OOP for public and private healthcare or went without treatment. One quarter of individuals (and one third of the poor) who reported not to have received formal medical treatment when sick claimed the reason was financial (INEI, 2006) .
From 2002, poor children (<18 years) and poor pregnant women were exempted from paying user fees for basic health care at National Health Service (NHS) facilities.
5 Providers were reimbursed through the tax-financed Seguro Integral de Salud (SIS), which covered 16% of the population in 2006. This programme also covered basic emergency care for poor uninsured adults with life-threatening or potentially permanently damaging conditions. The programme is not an autonomous fund that purchases health care on behalf of its beneficiaries. Rather, it is one of the budgetary channels through which the NHS is financed (World Bank, 2011). The budget is set annually by the Ministry of Finance on an ad hoc basis rather than in direct relation to the population covered. In 2006, the budget allowed spending of just $18 per beneficiary. During the period studied, facilities were reimbursed according to tariffs set to cover the costs of medicines and consumables, plus a markup. Salary and capital costs were not reimbursed. They had to be covered from the general NHS budget. Claims usually exceeded the programme's budget resulting in delay or outright refusal of reimbursement (Francke, 2013; World Bank, 2011) .
There was and remains a gross shortage of medical manpower. In 2006, there were only 1.24 health workers in public facilities per 1,000 population (Ministerio de Salud, 2016) . This is well below the recommended threshold of 2.3 for effective delivery of primary care (World Health Organization, 2013) . The average masks stark inequality to the disadvantage of rural areas-the medical worker population rate ranges from 0.7 to 3.7 across Peru's 25 regions.
Before and after the 2007 reform, formal sector employees and their dependents were covered by the El Seguro Social de Salud (EsSalud). Coverage through this scheme is retained after retirement and for up to 1 year of unemployment. Financing is by a 9% payroll tax. Independent workers can enrol voluntarily but very few do. 6 The programme covered 18% of the population in 2006. The benefit package comprehensively covers ambulatory and inpatient care, including high-cost treatments, as well as medicines. There is no cost sharing. Care is accessed through the scheme's own provider network that does not overlap with the NHS facilities accessed through the programme for the poor. Spending per beneficiary was $205 in 2006, one third above the national average.
7 Still, resources were strained and long-waiting times resulted in a nontrivial share of beneficiaries opting to pay OOP for direct access to private health services (INEI, 2006) .
The 2007 reform
Legislation extending coverage through the SIS programme to the entire poor population was passed in June 2005, but it was not put into effect until March 2007. This gave 6 million Peruvian adults-21% of the population-entitlement to basic health care at public NHS facilities without charge.
8 Previously, these individuals were required to pay user fees ranging from $2 for an outpatient consultation to $53 for a hospitalization with major surgery, not including payments for medicines and medical supplies.
Simultaneous to the extension of population coverage, the SIS benefit package was made more comprehensive. In principle, it fully covered treatments for conditions estimated to account for around a quarter of the burden of disease (Francke, 2013) . Treatment of other conditions was supposedly covered up to a ceiling of $2875 per episode, and a high-cost disease fund provided additional coverage for treatments costing up to $5750. necessary for surgery mean that the service coverage actually available is likely to have fallen well short of that promised (Bernal et al., 2016; Francke, 2013; Vermeersch et al., 2014) . Effective coverage of inpatient treatment was likely to have been particularly limited.
Two strategies were used to enrol the poor population. In the poorest 880 (/1,832) districts, every uninsured individual could enrol when accessing a NHS facility. In the rest of the country, as had been the case for children and pregnant women prior to the reform, the poor were identified by a proxy means test. This was administered at an NHS facility based on the information on asset ownership, housing conditions, demographics, education, and occupation provided by the applicant. Poverty status was determined by an algorithm that was kept secret to reduce the risk of gaming and was used to establish eligibility for the SIS programme only. Enrolment was immediate if there was a computer at the facility and otherwise took up to 8 weeks. It was free of charge and remained valid for 3 years.
Means testing at the facility is potentially vulnerable to both adverse selections by nonpoor claimants in bad health and strategic rejection of poor applicants by providers seeking to protect user fee revenue given modest and unreliable reimbursement from the insurance programme. Facilities are more certain of user fee income and have greater autonomy in spending it (Francke, 2013) . Estimates of the programme's target efficiency vary. Leakage to the nonpoor and better-off is estimated to be 12-14% (Arróspide et al., 2009; Vermeersch et al., 2014) . The gap in coverage among the poor is estimated in the range of 16-24% (Arróspide et al., 2009; Vermeersch et al., 2014) . These inaccuracies reflect not only strategic behaviour on the part of both patients and providers but also the inevitable discrepancy between a proxy means test and a more complete measure of poverty based on consumption data (Vermeersch et al., 2014) . Figure 1 shows coverage rates based on health insurance status reported in the nationally representative ENAHO household survey. From 2007, enrolment in the programme for the poor rises and there is a corresponding fall in the estimated fraction of the population without coverage from 62% in 2006 to 46% in 2008. Over the next 2 years, the share of the sample that reports being uninsured falls by an additional 10 percentage points. In the target population of poor adults, which we identify using the official poverty line, the fraction uninsured is estimated to fall from 90% in 2006 to 40% by 2010. In that year, one-half report being enrolled in the health insurance for the poor programme. Only 1% had been enrolled in 2006. Most likely, the gradual increase in reported coverage during the postreform period is because potential Figure 1 . Health insurance enrolment rates. a) Full population. b) Target population (poor adults). Notes: National household survey (ENAHO) estimates of percentage reporting each type of health insurance. Population weights applied. Insurance for the poor is reported enrolment in the SIS programme. Employment-based insurance is reported enrolment in the EsSalud scheme. Other includes schemes for the military and police, plus private insurance. The target population consists of adults (>19 years) with household per capita consumption below the official poverty line beneficiaries postponed enrolment until treatment was needed. It may also be because many were unaware of their acquired entitlement due to limited promotion of the coverage extension (Arróspide et al., 2009) , and others had been denied exemption from user fees by facilities operating strategically. There is little scope for public health insurance to have crowded out private insurance. The fraction of poor Peruvians with private insurance was only 1% prior to the reform and fell only slightly to 0.8% after the reform. Figure 1b shows that the proportion of the poor holding employment-based insurance changed little after the reform. This suggests that the offer of coverage to those without formal employment did not cause a movement out of this sector of the economy. Any welfare gains from the reform are unlikely to have been substantially offset by inefficiencies arising from disincentives for formal employment.
The coverage extension was accompanied by increased spending on health care (Figure 2 ). Due to rapid economic growth, health expenditure as a share of GDP held stable until 2008 before increasing in 2009 due to the sharp increase in real health expenditure and the stalling of the economy in the wake of the financial crisis. Real public health expenditure per capita increased by 18.7% between 2006 and 2008, compared with an increase of only 3.7% between 2004 (World Health Organization, 2016 . By 2009, public expenditure was 44% above what it had been in 2006 and the budget of the SIS programme had risen by 47%. But this was not nearly proportionate to the expansion of population coverage, with the result that real programme spending per person covered decreased by 31%. 10 The gap between nominal and effective coverage most likely widened. Implicit rationing was necessary to keep spending within the programme budget that was not set on the basis of a costed benefit plan and size of the covered population (Francke, 2013) .
DATA
Sample
We use four waves of the nationally representative ENAHO cross-sectional survey conducted by Peru's National Institute of Statistics and Informatics (INEI) in the period [2005] [2006] [2007] [2008] [2009] . A consistent sampling design and questionnaire is used to survey around 20,000 households containing about 90,000 individuals annually. Interviews take place throughout the year.
The individual is the unit of analysis. Although the reform increased the depth of coverage for population groups-principally, poor children and poor pregnant women-previously covered by the insurance for the poor programme, we restrict attention to the impact on those not previously covered-poor adults. We identify this target group as follows. First, we drop from the sample individuals who report holding private insurance, those below the age of 20 and women reporting to have used antenatal care or delivery assistance over the past 12 months.
11 Second, we restrict the sample to individuals identified as poor. Poverty status is assessed not based on the proxy means test used at health facilities to assess eligibility but using the official definition of household per capita consumption below the regional poverty line.
12 This identifies the target poor population that would be covered by the programme if it were feasible to assess entitlement using the most comprehensive measure of poverty. Our goal is to estimate the programme ITT effect on this target population. Inefficiency of the means test in targeting the poor and limited awareness of programme entitlement among the poor would both cause our analytical sample to differ from a random sample of those awarded coverage. This will not result in a biased estimate of the effect in the target population. Rather, it will correctly estimate an effect that is reduced by deficiencies in targeting the poor and alerting them of their entitlement.
The third restriction we impose on the sample is to drop observations from the 880 poorest districts, where the automatic enrolment procedure applied. These districts benefited from a national poverty alleviation strategy (CRECER) that consisted of numerous nutrition and social programmes, including a conditional cash transfer scheme (JUNTOS; Perova and Vakis, 2009) , 13 and was implemented near simultaneously to the extension of health insurance coverage (Borra, 2010) . Unlike the health care reform that targeted adults, the antipoverty programme focused on (malnutrition of) children. However, it potentially affected the health care utilization and expenditure of adults through household income effects. If we did not exclude the CRECER districts, then it would be difficult to claim that we had identified the effect of the health insurance extension alone. We do examine the sensitivity of the estimates to including these districts.
Treatment and comparison groups
Within the selected sample of poor adults, we assign those who report being covered by employment-based social health insurance (El Seguro Social de Salud) to the comparison group and all other individuals to the treatment group. The comparison group consists of low-paid-salaried employees, poor retired and unemployed former salaried employees, certain categories of workers, and adult dependents of these groups.
14 As previously mentioned, the relative size of this The treatment group consists of individuals who report being covered by the health insurance for the poor programme or having no insurance. As is clear from Figure 1b , a substantial fraction of the target group continues to report being uninsured after the reform. Besides being consistent with the identification of ITT effects, 11 We also drop those with cover through the military and police forces. We exclude individuals aged 18 and 19 because the benefits they became entitled to in 2007 differed from those aged 20+. Our sample will include some pregnant women who did not report using antenatal care or birth attendance in the past 12 months although they were entitled to access these services even before the reform. 12 We diverge from the official measure by comparing household consumption net, not gross, of health payments with the poverty line. This avoids classifying individuals as non-poor because of high OOP spending financed from savings, credit, etc. This does not rule out selection on the outcome if health spending is partly financed by cutting back on other consumption. There is some evidence that households can smooth consumption over temporary illness and medical treatments in Peru (Diaz and Valdivia, 2011; Neelsen, unpublished material) . Nevertheless, we check the robustness of our estimates to using total consumption gross of health payments to identify the poor. 13 This CCT was introduced in 638 of the 880 CRECER during our estimation period and was not in operation anywhere else in the country (Perova and Vakis, 2009 ). 14 The comparison group may include some rural workers, domestic servants, fishermen, and certain other independent workers who enrolled voluntarily in the social insurance programme at a reduced contribution rate. Such workers constituted only 1% of total enrolment in 2009 (EsSalud, 2010) . Our estimates are robust to excluding households with an independent worker from the comparison group.
inclusion of these individuals in the treatment group avoids bias that would arise if enrolees were compared with nonenrolees given that enrolment can take place at the time of health care utilization. The left panel of Table I shows means of covariates in the prereform period for the treatment and comparison groups. This reveals substantial and statistically significant differences in sociodemographic characteristics that reflect the attachment of only one group to the formal economy. Among other things, the comparison group is older and has a larger share of individuals not working due to the inclusion of retired social insurance beneficiaries. It also has a larger share of married individuals because coverage extends to spouses. Because social insurance is tied to formal sector employment, the comparison group also has higher shares of employment in services and nonmanual occupations, it is better educated, more likely to reside in urban areas and, on average, has a higher level of consumption (below the poverty threshold). Moreover, the comparison group enjoys better Table I . Covariate means and changes in means by treatment status Prereform (2005 Prereform ( /2006 Change ( Note. Sample of poor individuals aged 20+ who do not report use of maternity care in past 12 months and reside outside the 880 poorest districts. Treatment group (T) consists of those reporting being uninsured or being covered by the health insurance for the poor programme.
Comparison group (C) includes those reporting employment-based health insurance. *Significant change over time at 10%. **Significant change over time at 5%.living conditions, with higher rates of access to improved water sources, sanitation, and modern cooking fuels (see online Appendix Table A1 ). The right-hand panel of Table I shows the prereform and postreform change in the mean of each covariate for each group. There are fewer differences in the differences than there are in the levels. The treatment group somewhat catches up in mean age but the difference in the gender balance widens. There are also some differences in changes in education and service sector employment, and consumption growth is faster in the treatment group than it is in the comparison group.
Controlling for these time varying covariates will help reduce the risk of compositional bias in our DID estimates. But given the baseline differences in observables, it bears emphasis that the estimates will only be informative of the impact of the coverage extension if the comparison group, conditional on covariates, is indicative of the outcomes that the treatment group would have experienced in the absence of the reform. To increase the plausibility of this identification condition, we demonstrate robustness of the estimates to both weighting the comparison observations to make them more similar to the treated and restricting the treatment group to observations that are more similar to the controls.
IMPACT ON HEALTH CARE UTILIZATION
Outcomes and simple DID
The reform was intended to improve the poor's access to health care. We estimate the impact on the following indicators of utilization: (a) any ambulatory consultation in the last 4 weeks, (b) any use of medicines (prescribed or not) in the last 4 weeks, (c) any diagnostic test or examination in the last 4 weeks, (d) any visit to dentist or ophthalmologist in the last 3 months, and (e) any hospitalization or surgical operation in the last year. Each category includes treatments that are in the benefit package of the health insurance for the poor programme. With the data available, it is not possible to restrict the measures to covered treatments only.
15 So, for example, an ambulatory consultation for an acute infection would be included in (a) and is covered. Treatment for a sequela of that condition would also be included in (a) but is not covered (unless immediately life threatening). Only medication issued in NHS facilities is covered, although use of all pharmaceuticals is included in (b). Nominal coverage of dental and ophthalmic care is basic and effective coverage likely even more limited due to a shortage of supply. The programme only covers treatment in NHS facilities, which is not distinguished from treatment in other facilities in the data. This is not a limitation because the aim is to establish whether the reform succeeded in increasing access. If it merely resulted in the substitution of public for private treatment, then no effect will be found. Table II shows the mean of each utilization indicator in the prereform and postreform periods for the treatment and the comparison group, as well as the simple DID across the groups. Prior to the reform, all indicators show substantially lower utilization in the treatment group that lacked insurance compared with the comparison group that did not. Less than 15% of the treatment group had at least one ambulatory consultation in the pastpercentage points less likely to receive medicines in the last month. All of the baseline differences in the means across groups are statistically significant at 1%.
The third column of Table II reveals significant increases in utilization of all types of health care except for dental and ophthalmic care in the group to which coverage was extended. For the comparison group, in which coverage was unchanged, there was a significant increase only in ambulatory care and in inpatient care. For ambulatory care, the increase in use by the comparison group is less than half of that by the treatment group. As a result, the simple DID indicates a significant 5 percentage point rise in the probability of having a consultation, which is attributable to the reform under the assumption that the trends in the utilization rates would have been equal across the groups in the absence of the reform. This estimate is more than a third of the baseline rate of utilization of the treatment group. The simple DID estimate of a significant increase of 4.6 percentage points in the probability of receiving medication is 14% of the baseline rate. For diagnostic tests and dental or ophthalmic care, the point DID estimates are both positive but not significant. The probability of a hospitalization increased by almost twice as much in the comparison group as in the treatment group and so the unconditional DID is negative but not remotely significant.
Overall, comparison of the changes in means suggests that the reform may have raised utilization of ambulatory care and medicines among the poor adult population previously without cover but that it did not effectively increase access to inpatient treatment.
Although the prereform differences in utilization rates between the treatment and comparison groups do not invalidate the DID identification strategy, the magnitude of the differences, together with those in covariates documented in Table II , may give cause to question the plausibility of the common trends assumption. We test whether the outcomes were following common trends in the treatment and comparison groups prior to the reform. We use data from the 2004, 2005, and 2006 ENAHO surveys, select the sample and define treatment and comparison groups as above, and assess whether the prereform trend in each utilization rate was similar for these groups. 16 A simple plot appears to show some difference in the trends for medication but the null of no differential trend is not rejected (see online Appendix Figure A1 and Table A2 ). This hypothesis is also neither rejected for ambulatory care nor diagnostic examinations. These results lend credibility to interpretation of the simple DID estimates as indicative of a positive impact of the reform on access to ambulatory care and medication. The only prereform trends that differ significantly across the groups are for dental or ophthalmic care (2005) and inpatient care (2006) . But for neither of these types of care is there a significantly positive DID estimate that we risk incorrectly attributing to the reform.
Conditional DID
Controlling for time varying covariates can help reduce the risk of compositional bias and increase the precision of the estimates. Given all the outcomes are binary and some have low prevalence rates, we estimate the conditional probabilities using logit models specified as follows:
where y it = 1 indicates that individual i in year t makes use of one of the health services, Λ is the logistic function, Treat i = 1 indicates membership of the treatment group, Year t = 1 indicates the observation is from year t, Post t = 1 if the observation is from year 2008 to 2009 and X it is a vector of covariates. The latter includes all the variables listed in Table I and online Appendix Table A1 . Demographics are represented by 12 age-sex group indicators and urbanization of the location is captured by eight indicators of housing density. In addition, we include indicators of 25 regions and of the month of the survey interview. If, in the absence of the reform, all the year coefficients in the linear index would be common across the treatment and comparison groups, then the ITT effect is given by the partial effect of the Treat × Post indicator averaged over the (target) treatment group during the postreform period (Puhani, 2012) ,
where 1() is the indicator function and N TP is the number of observations in the treatment group in the postreform period. Standard errors are computed by a delta method that is robust to heteroscedasticity and clustering within households and take account of the sampling variability of the covariates (Korn and Graubard, 2011). These estimated effects are presented in column 1 of Table III . The estimated impact on ambulatory care is even larger than the simple DID estimate and suggests that the programme extension increased the probability that an individual in the target population had a consultation within a 4-week period by 6 percentage points, which is 41% of the prereform rate for the treated group of poor adults previously without insurance (Table II) .
It is estimated that the reform raised the probability of making use of medication within a 4-week period by 3.8 percentage points, which is somewhat less than suggested by the simple DID estimate. The magnitude of the estimated effect on the probability of getting a diagnostic test, which is one third of the baseline rate, is not affected by conditioning on covariates but it becomes strongly significant. As with the simple DID estimate, there is no significant impact on the chance of visiting a dentist or ophthalmologist. The point estimate of the effect on the probability of a hospital admission remains negative, but it falls in magnitude and remains not remotely significant.
These estimates suggest that the reform increased access to ambulatory care, medication, and diagnostic testing to an extent that is substantial relative to the rates at which poor adults were using these types of medical care prior to acquiring entitlement to basic insurance. There was no impact on care that the programme covered only to a limited extent-inpatient, dental, and ophthalmic treatment.
The conditions required to identify the policy impact are that the logit function correctly specifies the conditional expectation of the outcome and that under the counterfactual of no reform the time coefficients in the linear index would be equal across the treatment and comparison groups (Puhani, 2012) . In the prereform period, the latter restriction is not rejected for each of the three types of care for which the conditional DID estimate is significant (see online Appendix Table A2 ). Only for dental or ophthalmic care is there a significantly different year coefficient, but the conditional DID estimate is not significant for this category in any case.
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If one were to assume that all those not enrolled in the health insurance programme were not effectively covered and perceived themselves as such, then dividing an ITT estimate by the change in the fraction of the treatment group that is enrolled would give the average effect of insurance on utilization among those acquiring coverage.
18 Given eligible poor individuals could enrol when seeking treatment, this is a strong assumption that is likely to produce an overestimate of the impact of coverage. Imposing it gives an estimated 17 An alternative way of testing common trends in the prereform period is to use the 2004 and 2006 data to obtain a logit DID estimate of the "effect" of a placebo reform purportedly implemented in 2005. For each type of care, this estimate is small in magnitude and never close to being statistically significant (see online Appendix Table A3 ). 18 That is, the Wald estimates of the effect of insurance coverage on utilization. By definition, there is no change in insurance coverage of the comparison group. The DID estimate of the impact of the reform on insurance coverage is therefore the change in the treatment group, which is effectively the postreform rate given this group had little or no insurance prior to the reform. Note. Estimates of intention-to-treat effects defined in Equation 2. In column 1, the sample is as defined in the notes to Table I . In column 2, only data from 2006 (prereform) and 2008 (postreform) are used. In column 3, the sample of poor adults is selected using household consumption gross (rather than net) of health payments to assess poverty status. In column 4, the sample is expanded to include the 880 poorest districts in which the CRECER poverty alleviation programme was implemented. All models include the covariates listed in Table I and  online Appendix Table A1 , plus 12 age-sex group indicators, 25 region indicators, eight housing density indicators, and year and month effects. Robust standard errors adjusted for clustering within households in parenthesis (Korn and Graubard, 2011). *Statitiscal significance at 10%. **Statitiscal significance at 5%. ***Statitiscal significance at 1%.
19 percentage points increase in the rate of utilization of ambulatory care as a result of gaining basic insurance (see online Appendix Table A6 ). This is more than double the estimate obtained by Bernal et al. (2016) , which itself is an underestimate of the impact of insurance if some of those assessed as eligible based on the survey data are not effectively covered. Estimates of the effect of coverage on the probability of receiving medication and a diagnostic test are 12 and 2.5 points, respectively (online Appendix Table A6 ), which are much closer to the Bernal et al. (2016) estimates for these outcomes.
Impact on unmet need for treatment
A positive impact of insurance on health care utilization may raise or lower welfare depending on whether it arises from an income or a pure price effect (Nyman, 1999) . In poor, credit-constrained populations, there is likely to be a strong access motive for insurance. Redistribution from the healthy to the sick can provide access to otherwise unaffordable but needed health care. Moral hazard-utilization of low value health care induced by lower prices-is of less concern. Although it is very difficult to discriminate between moral hazard and income effects, the data do provide some opportunity to explore whether the extension of coverage reduced unmet need for treatment. The first column of Table IV shows the logit DID estimate of the impact of the reform on the probability of reporting illness in the previous 4 weeks. 19 It is not remotely significant and is small relative to the baseline incidence of illness. This suggests that there is unlikely to be much selection bias in the DID estimate of the impact on the probability of receiving formal treatment when sick, which is presented in the second column.
20
The estimate indicates a 7 percentage point increase in the probability of treatment, which is almost two fifths of the baseline utilization rate. 21 The third column shows that the probability of not receiving formal treatment when sick because of lack of insurance or money is reduced by 8 percentage points, or more than a quarter.
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This is consistent with the insurance programme making needed medical care affordable to poor adults. 19 Illness is defined as experiencing any of the following in the last 4 weeks: (a) disease symptoms (cough, headache, fever, and nausea), (b) illness (flu, colitis, etc.), (c) chronic disease relapse, and (d) accident. 20 Selection corrected (heckprobit) estimates of effects on the probability of formal treatment and forgone treatment for financial reasons when sick are extremely close in magnitude and significance to those presented in Table 4 . In the absence of plausible exclusion restrictions, identification is through nonlinearity. 21 Formal treatment is defined as receipt of care in response to illness or accident at any on nine types of public and private healthcare facilities as opposed to being treated at a pharmacy or a drugstore, at a traditional healer, at home, or not seeking care at all. All of the increase in utilization is attributable to increased use of public facilities. We estimate a 10 percentage point increase in provider visits that were financed wholly or partly by insurance (baseline is 2.7 percent). 22 Those reporting illness but not having received formal treatment are asked why they did not visit a health centre or facility. We identify those answering that they did not have insurance or money. 
Robustness
The results presented in columns 2-4 of Table III demonstrate that the estimates are largely robust to alternative choices that could be made in selecting the sample. For the main analysis, we use a 2-year window around the 2007 reform. Given the gradual increase in enrolment in health insurance for the poor observed in Figure 1 , a 2-year postreform period increases the likelihood of capturing the full effect of the reform. Moreover, because the comparison group is rather small in comparison with the treatment group, a wider window makes the estimate less susceptible to statistical aberrations. On the other hand, a narrower window would reduce the risk of compositional bias.
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Column 2 of Table III shows estimates obtained using the 2006 and 2008 observations only. The point estimate of the effect on ambulatory consultations diminishes by about 25% in size relative to the main estimate but it remains highly significant and also large relative to the consultation rate prior to the reform. 24 The estimated impact on the utilization of medicines is less than half of that obtained using all 4 years of data and statistical significance is lost. This may reflect substitution of over-the-counter medicines with prescription drugs immediately after coverage of the latter was introduced with a positive net effect only emerging later. The positive, significant impact on diagnostic testing is somewhat larger with the narrower estimation period. There remains no significant effect on dental or ophthalmic care and on inpatient care, although for the latter there is a substantial rise in the magnitude of the negative point estimate.
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Poverty is officially defined as total household consumption below a threshold. We depart from this by identifying the poor as those with consumption net of health payments below the poverty line. This is done to reduce the risk of selection bias due to health care utilization and related expenditure raising total household consumption above the poverty line (see footnote 12). Arguably, this leads to a discrepancy between our sample and the target population. And it may still result in selection on the outcome if medical expenses crowd-out expenditures on other goods. The results in column 3 of Table III reveal that, apart from the effect on utilization of diagnostic tests, the estimates are highly robust to sticking strictly to the official measure of poverty.
The results given in column 4 demonstrate that the estimates are generally robust to including the 880 poorest districts in which the anti-poverty strategy was implemented simultaneously to the extension of basic health insurance to poor adults. The estimated effect on diagnostic testing again falls to approximately half of the main estimate but in this case it remains marginally significant. The sensitivity of the estimated impact on this outcome is likely due to the fact that it has the lowest prevalence-only 2.5% of the treatment group had a diagnostic test prior to the reform.
The estimates are generally robust not only to the selection of the sample but also to the estimator. The least squares estimate of the effect on ambulatory care given in the first column of Table V is closer to the simple DID estimate than it is to the logit estimate, but it remains strongly significant. The estimated effect on medication is even more robust to estimation by least squares. The point estimate of the effect on diagnostic tests falls somewhat using least squares and, as might be expected, the standard error increases such that significance is lost.
In columns 2-4 of Table V, the comparison groups and prereform treatment group observations are made observationally equivalent to the treated observations by applying inverse probability weights that are based on estimated propensity scores of being treated.
26 This is a flexible way of making the common trends identification assumption conditional on covariates that may be associated with the dynamics of the outcome without imposing restrictions on the conditional expectation of that outcome (Abadie, 2005) . It is particularly advantageous in this application given the marked differences in covariates between the treatment and comparison groups. Besides correcting for selection on observables in this unrestrictive way, taking the DID still allows for differences in time invariant unobservables across the treatment and comparison groups. Pair cluster (on household) bootstrapped standard errors are used.
In general, the estimates are reasonably robust to adoption of the IPW estimator. In column 2, all observations are used. The effect on ambulatory care essentially does not differ from the logit estimate. The estimated effects on medication and diagnostic testing somewhat decline in magnitude and lose significance. Using all observations potentially makes the estimates highly sensitive to comparison observations that are given very large weights. To avoid this, column 3 trims the sample by dropping any observation (there is only one) with a weight that is more than 1% of the sum of all weights (Huber et al., 2013) . The estimated effect both on ambulatory care and on medication increases in magnitude, and the effect on the latter moves closer to significance (p value = .163). Extrapolation to treated observations that are off the support of the distribution of propensity scores for the comparisons may also be a concern when conditioning on covariates. Restriction to the common support comes at the cost of no longer estimating the average effect across all in the target treatment group. 26 The propensity score of being treated is estimated by three separate probit models that discriminate between treated observations and, in turn, comparison observations prereform (k = 1), comparisons postreform (k = 2), and treatment group observations prereform (k = 3). Let the estimated propensity score for an individual in group k be Φ X itγk ð Þ . Then, that observation is given a weight equal to wi = w , where
and N is the total number of treated and nontreated observations. The treated observations are given a weight of 1. The estimator is the treatment-comparison group difference in the postdifferences and predifference of the weighted means. Nonetheless, in column 4, we drop all observations with an estimated propensity score greater than 0.9 (Crump et al., 2009) . Despite the fact that this results in the loss of around 29% of the sample, the estimated effect on ambulatory care is similar to that obtained with the one heavily weighted comparison observation dropped and is highly significant. The estimated effect on medication use is very similar to the logit and least squares estimates, and it is significant at the 10% level.
In online Appendix Table A7 , we give estimates obtained from combining IPW with (least squares) regression adjustment for covariates to give a doubly robust estimator that is consistent (given conditional independence) if either the propensity score model or the regression model, but not necessarily both, is correctly specified (Robins and Rotnitzky, 1995) . The estimates are generally highly consistent with those obtained from the other three estimators. One difference is a significant positive impact of the reform on use of diagnostic tests, which is about double the size of the significant effect estimated by logit.
Overall, estimates obtained from various samples and estimators all point to the extension of coverage having raised utilization of ambulatory care and medication in the target group of poor adults but having had no impact on their access to dental or ophthalmic and inpatient care, which the programme covered only to a limited degree. There is some evidence that utilization of diagnostic tests increased, but the estimated effect is less robust, probably because prevalence is very low.
Heterogeneous effects
The analysis conducted in the previous subsection revealed some sensitivity of the estimates to narrowing the window of analysis around the reform. A possible reason is that the full effect of the coverage extension was not reached in the first year after implementation because beneficiaries were not yet aware of their newly acquired entitlement. We assess this hypothesis by using 2 years of data either side of the reform but allowing the effect to differ in the first and second postreform years. Specifically, we extend Equation 1 by interacting the treatment group indicator with a year 2008 dummy and a year 2009 dummy. Average partial effects of each interaction calculated over the treatment group sample observed in each of these years are given in the first two columns of Table VI . For all types of health care, the point estimate of the effect is larger in 2009 than it is in 2008, but none of the differences is statistically significant. The coverage extension is estimated to have raised the probability of consultation by 6.9 percentage points in 2009 and by 5.2 points in 2008. Because the nonlinearity of the logit model can produce differential effects, we also test for heterogeneity using the linear probability model. The results given in online Appendix Table A8 are generally consistent with the logit estimates with respect to differences in the point estimates by year but again no difference is significant. There is some indication of a delay in the reform taking full effect but the evidence is not strong.
Within the adult population, health care needs rise strongly with age. If the poor were previously forgoing needed health care, then the extension of coverage should have a larger impact in the older population, at least in absolute terms. We test for this by splitting the sample into younger (20-49 years) and older (50+) individuals and estimating a set of models separately for each. The resulting average partial effects are presented in the third and fourth columns of Table VI. All point estimates are larger for the older sample. The differences are significant for ambulatory consultations, diagnostic testing, and dental or ophthalmic care. It is estimated that while the reform raised the probability of an ambulatory consultation in the older population by 8.8 percentage points, the impact on the younger adult population was 4.2 points. This difference does not simply reflect the elderly's higher rate of utilization. Relative to the baseline mean, the effect on older individuals is still approximately twice that on younger adults. The estimated effect on the probability of receiving medication is fourfifths larger for the older group-a 5.2 compared with a 2.9 percentage point increase. There is a significant impact on the likelihood of getting a diagnostic test only for older individuals. This effect is large: the utilization rate is estimated to almost double as a result of the reform. Even for dental or ophthalmic treatment there is a significant effect for the older group that is 39% of the baseline utilization rate. For inpatient treatment, the point estimate is positive only for the older sample but even then it is not remotely significant. Overall, the results suggest that the reform had a substantially larger impact on the health care utilization of older compared Note. Difference-in-differences estimates from logit models. Year-specific average partial effects obtained from a model that allows the coefficient on the Treat × Post indicator to vary across the 2 years. Average partial effects for remaining subgroups obtained from split-sample estimates. Treatment and comparison groups defined as in notes to Table I with younger poor adults. Using a linear probability model to estimate the effects does not change this conclusion (see online Appendix Table A8 ). If the removal of user fees raised utilization by making previously unaffordable care accessible, then the effect should be greater among the poorest. To test this, we split the sample by household per capita consumption below and above the median, and estimate effects for each group (Table VI) . Bearing in mind that the sample consists of poor adults only, this discriminates between the poorest and the not quite so poor. The estimated effect on ambulatory care is greater among the poorest (10% level of significance). The point estimate of the effect on medication is also larger for the poorest, but this difference is not significant. Moreover, there is a significant positive effect on the use of dental and ophthalmic care only for the poorest. In contrast, the estimated effect on diagnostic testing is larger and significant only for the less poor. Although this difference across the groups is not significant, it is consistent with diagnostic tests, which may not be fully covered, remaining unaffordable for the poorest. But for a general loss of precision, the ordering of effects by poverty severity remains intact using ordinary least squares (online Appendix Table A8 ).
Given poverty is considerably more severe in rural areas, where accessibility remained limited even after the affordability constraint on utilization was relaxed, any greater impact of the programme on those previously least able to afford health care could be partially or fully offset by a smaller effect in the rural localities, where these individuals reside disproportionately. 27 In the estimation sample, 77% of urban dwellers but only 30% of rural dwellers lived in a district with a public hospital.
28 Only 3% of those in urban locations did not have a health centre within their district, compared with 18% of those in rural areas. Granting entitlement to free health care may have little impact if medical facilities and/or manpower are insufficient to respond to the increased demand.
The final two columns of Table VI provide estimates for urban and rural dwellers separately. 29 The point estimates for ambulatory care, medication, and diagnostic tests are all larger for the urban sample, but none of the differences is significant. The absence of a clear discrepancy could be due to the offsetting effects of differential accessibility to facilities and severity of poverty. 30 In any case, there is not strong evidence that the coverage extension failed to raise utilization in rural areas where health facilities and medical manpower are sparser.
IMPACT ON HEALTH CARE EXPENDITURE
The objective of the 2007 reform was to increase utilization of health care by the poor and to reduce inequality in access. Pursuing this through targeted removal of user fees at public facilities promised a second potential benefit-reduced exposure to medical expenditure risk. This section examines whether the extension of entitlement succeeded in reducing OOP payments for health care incurred by the poor.
Outcome and simple DID
Medical expenditure is reported at the individual level for each type of health care used. We estimate the effect on OOP spending aggregated over the five categories of health care utilization examined in Section 4. This measure includes expenditure on treatments that are fully or partially covered by the health insurance programme for the poor, as well as expenditure on uncovered treatments. With the data available, it is not possible to separate out and exclude the latter. OOP payments made by the household are reported separately from payments made by relatives and friends for care received by a household member. 31 We aggregate over these two financing sources and the five health care categories (after pro rata scaling to adjust for the different recall periods defined in the first paragraph of Section 4.1) to obtain total OOP spending per person for a 4-week period. Table VII shows mean OOP spending in the prereform and postreform periods for both the treatment and comparison groups. Prior to the reform when only the comparison group had insurance, the sample mean was only slightly higher in the treatment group and the difference is not significant. The difference is reduced by the treatment group's substantially lower utilization of health care (Table II) , which offsets the higher OOP price it faced. Among those who used health care or medication prior to the reform, mean OOP spending was a significant 44% higher in the uninsured treatment group.
In both groups, average OOP spending was higher in the postreform period (Table VII) . The treatment group increase may appear surprising given the acquisition of insurance. One must bear in mind that the insurance gained was far from complete: the benefit package included treatments for conditions that accounted for only one quarter of the burden of disease; not more than 30 percent of health care users in the treatment group reported that the health insurance programme covered at least part of their costs of treatment. Further, our measure of OOP expenditure includes spending on many partially covered and uncovered treatments. The increase in mean expenditure is smaller in the treatment group, which results in a simple DID estimate of a 7% reduction in OOP spending that is not significant. 
Conditional DID
We condition on observables using a generalised linear model that specifies mean medical expenditure (m it ) as an exponential function of covariates, 31 For each item of healthcare reported to be used by each household member, the respondent is asked to identify the source of finance of the resulting expenses. The two sources we use to construct the OOP measure are (a) "Paid for by a member of this household," and (b) "Given as a gift or paid for by members of another household." In each case, the amount paid is reported. It is unlikely that the respondent would include formal inter-household transfers through the insurance programme in category (b) because this source of finance is explicitly identified in another optional response to the question. Figure A2 ). Although the null of equal trends in the pretreatment period is not rejected (see online Appendix Table A9 ), the pattern observed casts some doubt on the plausibility of the simple DID identification assumption of common trends in the amount of expenditure in the postreform period if there had been no reform. However, this is not the assumption required for the validity of our main estimate presented in the next subsection. Table I . Difference-in-differences is post-pre reform difference in means of the treated minus that of the comparisons. Robust standard errors adjusted for clustering within households in parentheses (Rogers, 1994) . *Significantly different from zero at 10%.
where we use the same notation as in Equation 1 but obviously the parameters are different. We estimate the conditional means by gamma pseudo maximum likelihood (Gourieroux et al., 1984; Manning and Mullahy, 2001; Silva and Tenreyro, 2006) . This estimator has been shown to perform well even when there is a large proportion of observations with 0 values (Silva and Tenreyro, 2011) . In our sample, 63% of individuals report no OOP spending. Under the assumption that the proportionate change in spending would have been the same in the treatment and comparison groups if there had been no reform, the interaction term in Equation 3 is attributable entirely to the policy and the ITT effect is (Lechner, 2011) 33 :
The term in square brackets is the effect relative to counterfactual expenditure of the treated in the absence of the reform.
The point estimates in column 1 of Table VIII are negative but not remotely significant. If we select the sample using the official measure of poverty, then the estimated negative impact of the reform on the level of OOP spending is borderline significant (p value = .108) and the relative effect indicates a reduction of 18%. If the sample is extended to include the poorest districts in which the antipoverty strategy was implemented simultaneous to the extension of health insurance to poor adults, then the absolute effect increases in magnitude and reaches significance at the 10% level, and the relative reduction increases to 20%. But we are apprehensive about attributing this to the coverage extension alone. Least squares gives an estimate that is highly consistent in magnitude and (non) significance with the main gamma pseudo maximum likelihood estimate (see online Appendix Table A10 ).
The lack of robust evidence of a negative impact on mean OOP expenditure must be interpreted bearing in mind the offsetting effect of increased utilization of partially insured, and possibly of entirely uninsured, treatments. Expenditure will decrease by an amount equal to initial spending on services that become fully insured. It will fall further due to the reduced (but still positive) price of health care that becomes partially insured. These price reductions induce the increased utilization of (some categories of) health care found in Section 4. Greater use of partially covered health services will offset the direct effect of lower prices on OOP spending. Finally, spending on health care that is not covered at all by the insurance programme may fall or rise, and so either contribute to a reduction in OOP spending or counter any such tendency. On the one hand, demand for uncovered health services will fall as a result of becoming more expensive relative to fully and partially covered treatments. On the other hand, increased access to basic, insured health care may make patients aware of their needs for treatments that are not in the benefit package (Bernal et al., 2016) . Satisfying these needs will raise OOP spending. The data do not permit estimation of the effect on payments only for health care that became fully covered by the programme. Disaggregation into the five types of health care examined in the utilization analysis reveals no significant reduction in spending on any category (see online Appendix Table A10 ). The point estimate is negative only for payments for medicines, which is consistent with a substitution away from self-medication as formal care becomes relatively less expensive. However, this estimate is not remotely significant. There is a marginally significant estimated increase in expenditure on dental and ophthalmic care, which is the category that was least insured by the programme.
Effects across the distribution health care expenditure
Lack of strong evidence of an impact on the conditional mean of health care expenditure does not rule out effects on other parameters of the distribution. We test for this by estimating censored quantile regressions that take account of the large fraction of observations with no OOP payments (Chernozhukov and Hong, 2002) . 34 The conditional quantile function is specified as Q m : j q ð Þ ¼ max θ q Treat i þ τ tq Year t þ δ q Treat i ÂPost t þ X it β q ; 0 :
The DID between the treatment and comparison groups in the (conditional) quantile q of the uncensored distribution is δ q . If without the extension of coverage, this quantile of the medical spending of treated individuals would have changed as did quantile q of the spending of comparison households, then δ q corresponds to the effect of the reform on that (conditional) quantile (Athey and Imbens, 2006) . We estimate the average corner 34 Computation is done using an adaptation to the Stata® ado cqiv (Chernozhukov et al., 2012) . We are grateful to the programmers of the ado for making it available. We estimate the effect relative to counterfactual spending at the quantile by finding the median ofδ q θ q þτ tq Year t þX itβq over treated observations with a positive predicted quantile. We report 90% confidence intervals constructed from a bootstrap.
35 Figure 3 shows the estimates of absolute and relative effects from the 50th to the 90th quantiles in steps of 5. 36 The point estimate of the absolute effect is very close to 0 between the 50th and 65th quantile and is not significant below the 75th quantile. There is a significant reduction in OOP expenditure that increases in magnitude from the 75th to the 85th quantiles. The increasing magnitude is simply an artefact of moving up the distribution. The relative effect declines from a 26% reduction at the 75th quantile to a 17% decrease at the 85th quantile. The programme does appear to have reduced OOP expenses by a relatively large amount at and above the third quartile of the distribution.
CONCLUSION
Health systems of low-and middle-income countries that give priority to providing the poor with basic health care aim to correct the most blatant inequities. Achieving this is not a foregone conclusion. There are plenty of examples of subsidies that are inefficiently targeted on the poor, fee waivers that are ineffectively implemented, and public health facilities that are so lacking in manpower and supplies that even the poor are discouraged from using them. Before progressive universalism (Gwatkin and Ergo, 2011; Jamison et al., 2013) becomes a shallow slogan that is hijacked in defence of underperforming public health systems, it is important to establish that targeting can be effective in improving the poor's access to health care and their protection from medical expenditure risks. This paper demonstrates that granting poor Peruvians entitlement to free basic health care has been partially successful in realizing these goals. We estimate that it raised the 1-month utilization rate of ambulatory care by 6 percentage points against a baseline of 14.5%. This very substantial increase in access to first line medical treatment was accompanied by a one-third increase in the rate of diagnostic testing, and the medication rate was raised more modestly by 11%. These gains appear to have contributed to a reduction in inequality in utilization of ambulatory care that is evident in the significant inward shift of the concentration curve on the left-hand panel of Figures 4 . 37 The figure on the right reveals that the substantially greater inequality in access to inpatient treatment also decreased between the prereform and postreform periods. But consistent with our finding of no significant impact of the coverage extension on inpatient care, the shift in this distribution is appreciably more modest. This reflects the design of the policy, which offered a narrow benefit package and imposed ceilings on coverage. It is also likely due to the fact that reimbursement only for medication and consumables but not salary costs gave facilities very little incentive to deliver inpatient treatment even for conditions that were in the benefit package. And it likely reflects lack of physical access of the poor rural population to distant hospitals providing inpatient treatment.
We do not find robust evidence that the extension of insurance reduced mean OOP spending on health care, although spending in the top quartile of the distribution was reduced by up to a quarter. The muted impact on the mean may be attributable to the offsetting effect of increased utilization of partially covered, and possibly even of uncovered, treatments. Bernal et al. (2016) estimate that a later version of the health insurance for the poor programme in Lima raised mean OOP spending. Their explanation is that improved access to basic care makes individuals aware of their needs for treatments that are not fully covered by the benefit package. Spending on these treatments costs more than the savings made on fully insured basic care. This is a more credible scenario in the capital city, where there is an abundance of private providers ready to meet inflated demand, than it is in the periphery. The reasons we do not find this paradoxical result may be because we do not only estimate the effect in the capital, and we estimate the impact across the target poor population, as opposed to the effect on those at the margin of poverty. The latter might be able to afford partially, or even wholly uncovered, treatments as a result of increased awareness of their medical care needs, while those in deeper poverty may have to settle for what they get for free.
